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Abstract
This paper brings together and adds structure to the empirical literature on the link
between banking regulation and banking system stability. In addition to clarifying the
theoretical underpinnings for studying banking regulation, it points to several directions
for future empirical research, necessary to ￿ll the gaps in our understanding of the
link between banking regulation and stability. The paper starts with a review of the
literature on the design of banking regulation and its link with stability, followed by an
assessment of the most common methodologies used in this literature.The paper then
reviews the empirical literature of various banking regulations. This is followed by a
proposal on the new directions for research of the link between banking regulation and
banking system stability.
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11 Introduction
Banking is one of the most regulated and monitored industries in the world. In fact, there
exists no less than eight types of banking regulation.1 Two main reasons have been pointed
out to explain why this is the case. Firstly, is the perception of banks as fragile institutions
that need the help of government to evolve in a sound and safe environment; and secondly,
banking instability is costly to the entire economy as a result of the key role banks play in
￿nancial intermediation by providing liquidity insurance, monitoring services, and providing
economic and ￿nancial information.
However, this has not always been the case (see, e.g., Allen and Herring (2001)). At
the beginning, the banking industry was unregulated. It is only in the nineteenth century
that governments and Central Banks started to worry about ￿nancial instability and one
of their role increasingly came to be to eliminate crises. Moreover, the experience of bank
panics during the Great Depression had a profound e⁄ect on bank regulation in the US and
in almost all countries in the world. As a result banks became heavily regulated in every
country. Furthermore, in some countries the government intervened directly in the ￿nancial
system to allocate resources. Interest rates were strictly controlled and systemic risk was
avoided. Financial stabilization became the main objective of banking regulation.
The costs of banking crises were perceived to be so high that they had to be avoided at
all costs. Even though intensive regulations were able to eliminate systemic risk associated
with banks in the post war period, over time it became increasingly less obvious that heavily
regulated banking were optimal. This led to a worldwide wave of ￿nancial liberalization.
Unfortunately, it also led to the return of ￿nancial crises. As a by-product it induced a new
generation of regulations.
Since the re-introduction of ￿nancial liberalization in the 1980s, new types of regulation
have emerged: the most important being the Basel Accords with its capital adequacy re-
quirement and its supervision practices, the decline of the level of the reserve requirement,
the adoption or the redesign of deposits insurance, and the emergence of banking examina-
tion and supervision in a great number of economies. This new regulatory framework has
been praised for the international convergence of banks￿risk management standards and for
the improvement of these standards in many economies. Their design and implementation
have been blamed for increasing several market failures in the banking industry and recently
to be unable to avoid or at least to mitigate the e⁄ect of the ongoing subprime banking
crisis. For example Brimmer (1992) argued that:
1see, e.g., Mishkin (2000), Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004), and Allen and Herring (2001)
2￿Contrary to expectations,(...) the banking bill which became law in December 1991,
will most likely undermine the stability and the e¢ ciency of the banking system in coming
years. In the mistaken belief that it was helping to enhance the ￿safety and soundness￿of
individual banks￿ and simultaneously protecting Federal insurance funds￿ Congress actually
established an in￿exible regulatory regime which will cut back on the scope of the ￿nancial
activities in which banks can engage, increase the level and costs of capital requirements,
make the money market less e¢ cient, and involve regulators much more extensively in the
internal a⁄airs of banking institutions.￿
Existing banking regulations can be regrouped into three broad categories: regulatory
measures a⁄ecting the bank￿ s balance sheet (e.g., capital adequacy requirements, reserve
requirements, and asset holding restrictions), regulatory measures a⁄ecting the structure
of the banking system (separation of banking and other ￿nancial industries like securities,
insurance, or real estate (e.g., the Glass-Steagall act of 1933), and restrictions on com-
petition), and regulatory measures for banks￿owners￿and managers￿behavior (risk-based
deposit insurance premiums, disclosure requirements, bank chartering, and bank examina-
tion).
Despite the recent progress in the research on banking fragility and the growing public
interest in banking regulation due to the ongoing subprime banking crisis, there is still no
consensus on how best to design and implement banking regulation in this new context of
free-banking. According to Santos (2001), this is the result of our lack of understanding of
the mechanisms between banking regulation and market failure, and also the interaction of
these regulations among them. It is also a consequence of our limited understanding of the
implications of those regulations in a general equilibrium framework.
Notwithstanding of these limitations, the research already undertaken has produced
some important results, speci￿cally on the link between the type of banking regulation and
banking system stability. This paper contributes to this literature by bringing together and
adding structure to the contemporary theoretical and empirical literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical
review of the link between regulation and banking stability. Section 3 reviews the design
of banking regulations. Section 4 assesses the existing methodologies used in the empirical
literature. Section 5 reviews the empirical literature of various types of banking regulation.
Section 6 presents a proposal for new directions of research on the link between banking
regulation and banking system stability, and concludes.
Before proceeding, we should mention several important topics closely related to banking
regulation that our article does not deal with, as well as some of the references to these
3topics. Speci￿cally, our study does not deal with the link between regulation, banking
pro￿tability, and/or ￿nancial development (see, e.g., Bath, Caprio, and Levine (2004)). It
also does not deal with the link between regulation and bank governance (see, e.g., Beck,
Demirg￿￿-Kunt, and Levine (2006b)). The last preliminary point is on the selection of
countries that we talk about. Most of the available empirical evidence comes from the
United States and the group of ten member countries of the Basel committee. One reason
for this is the fact that data are generally more easily available for these economies than
for others, and another is that a great number of economic researchers is located in these
countries.
2 Reviewing the Link Between Regulations and Banks￿Sta-
bility
We have argued that one of the key rationales for banking regulation is the prevention of
banking crises. Hence, we start our paper with an e⁄ective review of the sources of banking
instability, and the channels through which regulations can prevent it.
2.1 Sources of Banking Instability
Let us start by making a di⁄erence between a numbers of de￿nitions. We will refer to bank￿ s
failure as the failure of one bank, and banking crisis or systemic banking crisis as a failure
of an important number of banks in a given banking system. Banking system fragility refers
to the presence of banking crisis in the banking system.
To fully understand banking stability we need to understand how a banking crisis occurs.
In the literature they are many de￿nitions of banking crisis:
(1) According to Schwartz (1985), Miron (1986) and Wolfson (1986), a banking crisis
is a demand for reserve money so intense that the demand could not be satis￿ed for all
parties simultaneously in the short run. For these economists a banking crisis is mainly
characterized by a liquidity crisis in the banking system.2
(2) According to Guttentag and Herring (1984) and Manikow (1986), a banking crisis
is a condition in which borrowers who in other situations were able to borrow without
di¢ culty become unable to borrow on any terms. Therefore, for these authors a banking
crisis is only characterized by a credit crunch crisis.3
2Let us remind that a liquidity crisis is a situation where the demand of liquidity is higher than the
supply of liquidity by the bank.
3The Council of Economic Advisors (1991) de￿nes a credit crunch as ￿a situation in which the supply of
credit is restricted below the range usually identi￿ed with prevailing market interest rates and the pro￿tability
of investment projects￿ .
4(3) According to Fisher (1933), Flood and Garber (1981) and Minsky (1982), a banking
crisis is a forced sale of assets because liability structures are out of line with market-
determined asset values, causing further decline in asset values￿ the bursting of a price
￿bubble,￿ ; in other world a banking crisis starts with a liquidity problem which lead to a
solvency crisis.4
(4) Finally according to the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (1985), a banking
crisis is a sharp reduction in the value of banks￿assets, resulting in the apparent or real
insolvency of many banks and accompanied by some bank collapses and possibly some runs.
This last de￿nition is more compelling in the sense that it combines at least two main
characterizations of bank￿ s failures given by the other authors i.e., nsolvency and liquidity
problems and also it provides a sequence of events.
Our de￿nition of banking crisis is more closed to this and it is the following. A banking
crisis is a sharp reduction in the value of banks￿assets as well as banks￿deposits, resulting
either from an apparent or real insolvency of many banks or from an apparent or real
liquidity problem in many banks and accompanied by some bank collapses and a possibly
credit crunch crisis.
To know the reasons of the occurence of banking crises, one needs to understand the
sources of liquidity as well as insolvency problems, then how it can move from one banks
to anothers. How it can generate banks collapse, banks panic and also credit crunch.
We will start by the sources and reasons for a banking crisis characterized by a liquidity
problem. In the literature many reasons has been used to explain why this can be the case.
Those reasons move from mismanagement of banks by managers to hysteria.
A bank run can be initiated by a sudden rush of withdrawals. This sudden rush can be
generated by a coordination failure among the bank￿ s depositors as well as other type of
failures. In fact, banks are characterized by balance sheets where banks￿liabilities (deposits)
are generally short-term, while their assets are long-term and illiquid.
In the literature the following reasons have been given as the trigger of bank runs:
(1) An arbitrary shift in expectations generally called sunspot (see, e.g., Diamond and
Dybvig (1983)).
(2) A shift in expectations due to the release of "bad news" (see, e.g., Morris and Shin
(1998, 2000), Goldstein and Pauzner (2000), Chari and Jagannathan (1988)).
(3) A productivity shock can trigger a bank run (e.g., Diamond and Rajan (2001a,
2001b), and Chen (1999)).
(4) A high level of unexpected non-performing loans in a bank. When this information
4An insolvency problem is a situation where the value of assets are less than the value of the liabilities.
5is known by the depositors, they rush to the bank to get back their deposits before the other
depositors. If markets for liquidity are ine¢ cient because of market power or information
asymmetries, the bank is forced to sell its long-term assets below their fair value, (see, e.g.,
Allen and Gale (1998), Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990), Donaldson (1992), and Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) and Chari and Jagannathan (1988)).
But even if coordination failure and the other above failures can cause the failure of
a bank, we need a linkage between banks in the form of information spillovers or credit
exposures to turn a bank run into a systemic banking crisis, (see, e.g., Allen and Gale
(2000a); Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000)). i.e., the inter-bank lending structure can lead
to contagion in the banking system and turn a bank failure into a systemic crisis.
Another characterization of banking crisis is the solvency crisis. A solvency crisis can
be initiated by a high level of non-performing loans in a bank. This can be generated by
liquidity problems in the context of asset price decline, (see, e.g., Allen and Gale (1998),
Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990), Donaldson (1992), and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
and Chari and Jagannathan (1988)). It can also be driven by a great depreciation or
devaluation of the domestic currency; this has been the case for many emerging countries in
Latin America and in East Asia crises (see, e.g., Sundararajan and Baliæo (1991)). Finally
a solvency crisis can also be generated by the losses in balance sheet as well as in o⁄-balance
sheet positions arising from movements in stock market prices. This risk has been proven
important by the ongoing subprime banking crisis. In fact, many banks found theirself
undercapitalized due to the drop of their share￿ s price on the stock market, the value of
their equity drop sharply and given that at least one third of their capital is in the form
of equity, they were forced to ￿nd additional money to meet regulatory requirement. Also
many banks hold securities of publicly trading companies, when the value of these securities
drop, the bank realizes a lost.
The credit crunch is one of the characterizations of banking systemic crisis given by
some authors. Under this type of crisis, banks refuse to lend to each others as well as to
entrepreneurs and consumers. It is then not a failure of one bank but the failure of the
entire banking system or at least an important share of the banking sector. There are still
controversies about the credit crunch as a source or a consequence of banking crisis. For
many authors credit crunch is a consequence of weakness in the banking sector. A credit
crunch arises when actors in the ￿nancial market lost con￿dence on the quality of assets
due for instance on the fact that their previous assessment was very optimistic and they
have realized important losses. It may also be a consequence of new regulations.
62.2 Solution for Banking Failure: Market versus Government
Banking crises are very costly. The typical cost in term of GDP loses is more that 20
percent for developing countries (see, e.g. Caprio et al. (2003)). Banking crisis creates a
lot of distress. Therefore, there is a huge need to ￿nd ways to reduce the likelihood of its
appearance, to reduce its duration and to mitigate its devastating e⁄ect on the economy
when it is ongoing.
There are many solutions that have been proposed, but the e¢ ciency of these solutions
is often a topic of controversy. One way to present this is to regroup the methods proposed,
based on who is in charge of developing and implementing the solutions: The government
(regulator) or the market. If there is no market failure there is no need of government
intervention through regulation. In fact, it plausible that regulations by hampering the well
functioning of the ￿nancial markets are part of the causes of the banking crisis. If there is
a market failure then there is a need for the government to adopt legislations to tackle it,
but even in this case, is it necessary to the government to implement these legislations by
itself?
The following market failures have been used by some to justify the need for banking
regulations: (i) depositors are generally uninformed and are not enough sophisticated to
monitor banks; (ii) the presence of assymetry of the information between depositors and
banks￿owners and/or manager￿ s; (iii) the presence of market power, (iv) the importance of
externalities.
Since the failure of any bank is awful to its depositors which are generally uninformed
and not enough sophisticated to monitor their bank (to see if they are good enough before
investing in), see, e.g., Dewatripont and Tirole (1994)), the government should intervene up-
front by putting in place laws which can reduce the likelihood of banking failures.5 Another
argument for intervention in order to maintain any bank in business is the asymmetry of
information typically present in the banking system, even if depositors form a union, it
will not be easy for them to obtain all the information that they need in order to make
optimal decision as the bank may have superior information. One solution for this is to build
regulations allowing for banks supervision and forcing banks to disclose all the necessary
informations needed to make a complete assessment of the risk and the return of each type
of asset.
But proponents of free-banking will argue that market can make this work better than
the supervisors. For them market discipline can force banks to reveal all the information
5Depositors are small enough and also their identities are not fully available; free-riding will be the
dominant strategy for many of them. This rendered the possibility of depositors￿unions unlikely.
7needed. In fact, banks who will release more information will be able to attract more
depositors, and therefore all banks would release the maximum amount of information in
other to attract a great number of depositors. Thus the equilibrium in the free banking will
be formed with banks that provide the optimal level of information needed by depositors
to make their decision. The problem with this is that generally the banking sector in many
countries even when the markets have been liberalized does not exhibit the feature of full
competition. In fact, banks may tend to act as an oligopoly, they implicitly agree on the
level of information they want to make available to the depositors, therefore market power
can mitigate market discipline.
Another problem with the market discipline argument is that bank￿ s managers are not
the owner of the capital of banks; they are not also the owner of the deposits that they use
to provide loans with. The structure of their remuneration allows them to take excessive
amount of money at the end of the years in form of bonuses if the return of their investment
is high. If the return is low or even negative they have no negative compensation on the gain
that they have realized in the previous years (see, e.g., White (2008)). This gives to banks￿
managers an incentive to invest more in assets which yield very high short-run return but
with a higher probability of default. In this environment the manager worried only about
the return in the short-run without thinking about the return in the long-run since it will
endure no cost or very little cost at that time.6
A question of interest here is: Why did owners of the banks have adopted this structure of
compensation? In the case of US one can argue that CEOs and members of top-management
form a small club of people, therefore they can implicitly agree on the term of their appoint-
ment given no choice to the owners.7 However, it is not only the top-management who has
this remuneration structure, traders and analysts have enjoy it too. This drives us to argue
that owners provide this type of structure because they too want to make money quickly
hoping to sell their share as soon as the bank is in trouble. Therefore, the fact of banks
being publicly trade companies make them vulnerable to speculative investors who ask for
higher return in order to invest in banks. Another reason for this owners￿behaviour can be
that they do not incur all the burden of a bankruptcy. In fact, in caseof systemic banking
crisis, they expect a bailout, based on the argument that governments don￿ t want to see a
credit crunch developed in the banking system. Owners always end up paying only a small
share of their debt, there is then a truncation of the owners￿return distribution curve given
then a big incentive for owners to take too much risks.
6John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000) have argued that there is an optimal top-management compensation
structure which can drive banks to not take excessive risks.
7This is only a lose answer since owners can ￿nd managers out from the club.
8In Basel II Accord, a great emphasis has been given to market discipline by asking banks
to publicly disclose some key information. This is an implicit acceptation of the fact that
the information will not be publicly disclosure without regulation, the regulator need to
force banks to do so. I our view and in light of the ongoing subprime banking crisis, market
discipline is not enough to insure stability in the banking sector. We then explore below
regulations useful in stopping banking crisis. Let us then provide the best regulations for
each type of banking crises.
2.3 Best Regulations by Type of Banking Crisis
As seen above a banking crisis can be characterized by: (i) a liquidity problem, (ii) a
solvency problem, and (iii) a credit crunch.
2.3.1 Regulations for crises due to liquidity problems:
A banks failure due to liquidity problem and materialized by a bank run can be prevented by
many techniques. The ￿rst one is the establishment of complete explicit deposit insurance.
In this case depositors know for sure that their money is safe, therefore even if their bank is
experiencing a liquidity problem, depositors with no need of money in the short-run will no
rush to ask for their deposits, this will be helpful for the bank as it can resolve its liquidity
problem without liquidating a substantial part of it assets at a lost.
A second idea is the suspension of withdrawal by the bank, this allow the bank to ￿nd
liquidity and to sell some of its asset at a better price without liquidating it at a silly price,
the problem with this solution is that after the suspension￿ s period, depositors will lose
faith in the bank and therefore they will ask their money anyway. So even if the theoretical
argument of Chari and Jagannathan (1988) shows that this is welfare improving, it will not
succeed to stop a liquidity problem to turn into a bank run.
A third idea is the scrutiny of withdrawal to provide money only to those who need
money; this is for sure a better solution than the suspension of withdrawal alone, but the
point is that it is practically impossible to do this.
A suspension of withdrawal to allow banks to ￿nd liquidity and liquidate at a good price
some of its assets couple with the scrutinizing of withdrawal will do a better job to stop
a bank failure due to liquidity problem and stop a bank run. The problem with this last
solution is it applicability.
Furthermore, Allen and Gale (1998) questioned the usefulness of the ￿rst arrives ￿rst
serve contract between banks and depositors. If this is a good policy during normal time,
it is questionable in crisis time. To avoid costly liquidation which is actually the most
9important cost of banking crisis according to them, a di⁄erent type of contract is required.
They advocated during crisis time that banks can state that they will split the remaining
resources to those asking for withdrawal. Therefore, it will be optimal for those without
need of immediate withdrawal to not join the run and wait until the next period to obtain
their promised cash. The problem with this argument is that no bank so far is providing
such a contract. Another di¢ culty with this is to see if depositors will be willing to put
their saving in banks under this type of contract. If one takes even their idea of agents
not knowing if they are late consumers or not at the beginning of the process, a contract
promising a ￿xed amount of payment at each period may prove dominant.
2.3.2 Regulations for crises due to solvency problems:
Another important source or reason of banking failure is the insolvency i.e., when the
value of assets are less than the value of the liabilities. If this has already occurred, the
government can bailout the bank or the bank can merge with a healthy bank in order to
avoid bankruptcy. The must important aspect of regulation is to prevent this insolvency
crisis to happen even for one bank. Regulations that serve this purpose are based on the
idea of increasing the proportion of save assets in each bank and also on the idea of portfolio
diversi￿cation. In fact, using the idea behind the CAPM i.e. ￿do not put all your eggs in
the same basket￿ , portfolio diversi￿cation allows banks to eliminate non-systematic risk and
can allow them to reduce their exposure to risks. But this portfolio diversi￿cation is not
e⁄ective under aggregate risk. Therefore in this case the bailout may end up being the only
ex-post solution. Bailout has been widely criticized for the moral hazard it introduces in
the banking industry. If bank￿ s owners know even implicitly that they will obtain bailout
they will have less incentive to reduce their risk exposure in the future. Generally, bank
used e¢ ciently portfolio diversi￿cation techniques without the need of a regulator or any
form of supervision.
Besides the diversi￿cation, the other important technique used in order to protect against
solvency problem is the risk-based capital adequacy requirement. If banks are forced to
maintain in form of equity, real estate, reserves, cash and other immobilizations, a given
fraction of risky assets they hold, this will reduce their incentive to take risks, because in
case of a failure and if the regulator is quick enough to detect the crisis at the beginning,
the equity share may be large enough to pay for the losses, and allow the regulator to pay
depositors without asking the taxpayer to pay for it.
102.3.3 Regulations to mitigate the a negative externality of banking crises:
More importantly, the failure of a bank can have a negative externality for many businesses
and economic actors. This externality can be contagion through the inter-bank lending
structure; it can be bank panic as other investors may ￿nd the banking sector not secure
enough and may want to pull out from it. So even if a failure of a bank may be seen by some
economists as the failure of a usual business (therefore no need for government intervention),
this negative externality provides a rational for government intervention when the bank is
big enough to generate a su¢ cient negative externality that can pose a threat to the entire
banking system stability.
The banking crisis contagion through inter-bank lending channel is very important, if
a major bank collapse, it exposes sound banks dealing with him to a non-performing loans
problem. If this is followed by a collapse or a merge for survival of another important bank,
it sends the message in the banking sector that many banks are unhealthy. This can drive
banks to refuse loans to each other, breaking the remaining inter-bank lending structure
and this can lead to a credit crunch as this had been the case with the ongoing subprime
banking crisis. In this situation contrary to Allen and Gale (2000a) where a complete inter-
bank lending structure is the best solution to stop contagion, inter-bank lending disappear
in this case.
What type of regulations can prevent such a disaster to happen or what type of market
structure can stop this type of contagion mechanism to be in place?
First, let us look at ex-ante solutions for this type of contagion. Allen and Gale (2000a)
state that if the inter-bank lending structure is complete, there is no possibility of conta-
gion, also if there is no inter-bank lending structure there is no possibility of contagion.
Therefore, ex-ante one has two market structures which can solve this market failure. The
￿rst structure is the best since it allow the existence of the inter-bank market it therefore
improves the completeness of ￿nancial market.
Is there any need to regulate the inter-bank lending ex-post? Ex-post when one or
more banks have failed the optimal market structure seems to be the absence of inter-bank
lending market, the asymmetry of information between banks can explain why this is the
case. The regulation is then needed here to insure the existence of the inter-bank lending
market even in case of crisis. Government can guarantee the credit makes by banks to each
other over that period to help the banking sector to get out of the freeze of the inter-bank
lending and also of the credit crunch.
With the observation that the collapse of some banks can trigger a freeze of the inter-
bank lending market (due the asymmetry of information available in this market), there is
11a room for regulation even ex-ante in this market. The regulator can enforce legislations
which force more transparency among banks, should disclose enough information about
their risk structure and their pro￿tability this will improve the decision manking process of
banks in choosing the best weight structure of their interbank lending.
Another externality is bank panic, when a big bank is allowed to fail, this send a message
to depositors that the banking sector is in a di¢ cult situation because if even a big bank
fail therefore small ones with less expertise and less possibility of portfolio diversi￿cation
may fail too. It follows that depositors of safe banks can panic and start to withdraw their
deposits. Banks￿panic has the ability to make even safe banks to fail. In order to stop this
possibility, complete explicit deposit insurance is needed, since it removes the incentive of
run and panics in the mind of other depositors and makes them not to join the run taking
place in the banks.
To end this subsection, it is important to say that deposit insurance is widely criticized
as been an important source of moral hazard behaviour in the banking industry (see e.g.
Demirg￿￿-Kunt and Detragiache (2002)). In fact, it removes the incentive to depositors
to monitor banks and drive them to focus only on the expected return. They then put
their deposits only into banks providing them the highest deposit interest rate. This drives
banks￿owners and managers to get involve in very risky activities.8
3 Review of the Design of Banking Regulation
Allen and Herring (2001) provides an explicit and comprehensive list of banking regulations.
Given that there are many objectives for these regulations, not all of these regulations have
as objective the stability of the banking sector. From this list, the following types of
regulation have been set in order to improve the stability of the banking system: (i) the
asset restrictions; (ii) the capital adequacy requirement; (iii) the deposit insurance, (iv)
the ￿t and proper entry tests; (v) the interest rate ceilings on deposits, (vi) the liquidity
requirement; (vii) the reserve requirements; (viii) the restrictions on services and product
lines. Mishkin (2000) and Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) have also provided lists of
banking regulation.9 10 Although these studies do not report the same regulations, they
8Lai (2006) provided a good survey of reasons behind banking fragility.
9From Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) these regulations are: (i) entry into banking, (ii) ownership, (iii)
capital, (iv) activities, (v) external auditing requirements, (vi) internal managements/organizational require-
ments, (vii) liquidity and diversi￿cation requirements, (viii) the deposit requirements, (ix) the accounting
/information disclosure requirements, (x) the discipline/problem institutions/exit, and (xi) supervision
10The basic regulatory measures pointed out by Mishkin (2000) are: (i) restrictions on asset holdings and
activities, (ii) separation of the banking and other ￿nancial industries like securities, insurance, or real estate,
(iii) restrictions on competition, (iv) capital requirements, (v) risk-based deposit insurance premiums, (vi)
disclosure requirements, (vii) bank chartering, and (viii) bank examination.
12do report many in common.
Since the publication of these papers there has been many developments on the regula-
tion front. The adoption of the Basel II Accord and the ongoing subprime crisis, have bring
some debates about the type of banking regulation needed for banking stability. Given the
increasing globalization in banking and ￿nancial industries which make the banking sector
to be vulnerable from risks developed in the ￿nancial market of other countries (e.g., the
subprime crisis), many economists and practitioners of banking regulation have advocated
the adoption of regulations which will take the speci￿city of the Islamic banks, take into
account risks taken by investment banks (which was not regulated in the US on the premise
that their failure would have been unable to create a systemic crisis in the ￿nancial sector),
and take into account risks created by hedge funds. A book by Davies and Green (2008)
provides some guidelines for the global ￿nancial regulation. Nevertheless, the existing lit-
erature can be analyzed around three groups based on their target.
3.1 Regulations A⁄ecting Bank￿ s Balance Sheet
Among the regulatory measures presented in this literature, three measures aims at a⁄ecting
the bank￿ s balance sheet: restrictions on asset holdings, capital adequacy requirements, and
reserve and/or liquidity requirements.
a) Restrictions on asset holdings aim at reducing the proportion of some type of risky
assets in the portfolios of banks. It is then a constraint on the asset side of the bank￿ s balance
sheet. Its theoretical justi￿cation is based on the presence of information asymmetries
between depositors and the bank manager, which can lead the manager to take too much
risk without being disciplined by the withdrawal of deposits. It is a regulation, which has
been adopted by many countries around the world. However, ￿ndings of Barth, Caprio, and
Levine (2004) show that the level of restriction is higher in lower-income countries than in
higher-income countries.
b) Capital adequacy requirements ask bank managers and/or owners to keep, in the form
of equities, ￿at money, and other form of immobilization, a given proportion of the amount
of the risky loans that they have made. This has a direct e⁄ect on the composition of the
liability side of a bank￿ s balance sheet. More importantly, it aims at providing incentives
for banks to hold less risky portfolios. In fact, this regulation can reduce their incentive to
provide too many risky loans since in the case of a failure they may lose all their equities.
There are many types of capital adequacy requirement; their design has also evolved over
time. According to Mishkin (2000) bank capital requirements typically take three forms:
(i) the ￿rst type is based on the so-called leverage ratio, which is the amount of capital
13divided by the bank￿ s total assets; (ii) the Basel I Accord type where assets and o⁄-balance
sheet activities are allocated into four categories, each with a di⁄erent weight to re￿ ect the
degree of credit risk; (iii) the third type is the capital requirement based on the level of
market risk taken by banks.
Given the importance of the capital adequacy requirement in the regulatory framework
of almost every country in the world today, we found useful to present some insight about
the design of the capital adequacy requirement as stated by the Basel II Accord. The risk-
weighted capital adequacy requirement is based on the concept of the capital ratio where
the numerator represents the amount of capital a bank has available and the denominator is
a measure of risks faced by the bank and is referred to as risk-weighted assets. The resulting
capital ratio may be no less than eight percent. The assessment of the risk-weighted assets
taken by a bank depends heavily on the technique used to measure it. The Basel II Accord
speci￿es the technique that should be used to assess each type of risks: credit risk, market
risk, and operational risk.
In light of the ongoing subprime banking crisis the latent debate on the right type of
regulation for ensuring stability has emerged with two main views of the need of capital
regulation.
(i) Firstly, the Basel Accords approach is the right approach and that regulators should
continue to improve it; see, e.g., Davies and Green (2008), Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006).
(ii) Secondly, Basel II bank capital regulation is not useful; it increases complexity and
fails to improve its accuracy. It therefore leads to susceptibility of manipulations of the
rules by banks and forbearance of enforcement by regulators. Only the market can assess
risks properly, which is why information needs to be harnessed by the regulators from the
market.
Also, there is a debate about optimal capital ratio for countries. According to Morrison
and White (2005), regulators with lack of reputation will be well served by strict rule
setting capital requirement at a higher level, but those with higher reputation can have
more discretion to set the capital requirement at a low level and modify it, given their
knowledge of the recent development in the banking industry that they have the charge to
supervise.
Finally, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) found that the stringency of capital require-
ments is lower for lower-income countries than for higher-income countries. The overall
capital stringency is lower in developing countries than in developed countries.
c) Reserve and/or liquidity requirements are a form of regulation which forces banks
to maintain, in the form of reserves, a given proportion of their deposits in an account
14of the Central Bank, and/or to maintain, in the form of liquidity, a given proportion of
deposits in their account. This type of regulation a⁄ects the composition of the asset size
of the bank￿ s balance sheet. This regulation can mitigate the incentive of a bank￿ s owner
and manager to get involved in too risky activities. Besides, the reserve requirement is
probably one of the most ancient types of banking regulation. It has been viewed as a
form of taxation on banks by governments, since generally these required reserves do not
bear interest. Many US economists have argued that a reserve requirement was needed in
the US because of the existence of a deposit insurance run by the government. But this
is no longer the view of a lot of Central Bank economists in developed economies. In fact,
in the 1990s some countries like Australia, Canada and New Zealand have abandoned the
use of this required reserves and even countries which have not removed it, have reduced it
substantially and more frequently. Meanwhile, in developing countries the reserve and/or
liquidity requirement is still used. Some countries have signi￿cantly reduced their reserve
requirement and increased the liquidity requirement. More than four-￿fth of the countries
still maintains a reserve requirement and about one-eighth of the countries has a liquidity
requirement.
3.2 Regulations A⁄ecting the Banking Sector Structure
Some regulations have an important impact on the structure of the banking system in a
given country. From the previous example of regulations the following can have a signi￿cant
in￿ uence on bank structure: regulations separating banking and non-banking business, and
restrictions on entry in the banking industry.
a) Regulations separating banking and non-banking business: some governments restrict
banks from involvement in commercial activities, which are considered to be outside the
core banking business and, therefore, may be more risky. In the United States there was
an even more restrictive policy, which was under application during the period 1933-2003:
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.11
We observed from the Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) survey that almost every country
(except New-Zealand) has at least a restriction on banks￿involvement in activities such as:
securities, insurance, real estate, and a bank owning non-￿nancial ￿rms. We also found
that restrictions imposed on bank activities are greater for lower-income countries than
higher-income countries; and that government ownership of banks increases in countries, on
average, as one moves from the higher-income level to the lower-income level.
11The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 forces banks to be separated from other ￿nancial industries such as
securities, insurance or real estate.
15b) Regulation on entry into the banking industry: there are many types of restrictions to
the entry into the industry. It ranges from the minimum amount of capital that the owner
should provide to the regulatory agencies, to the restriction of foreigners to own or invest
in banks. If the goal of the minimum amount of capital needed to enter into the banking
sector is mainly to limit competition, the goal of restricting foreign funds is three-fold: to
limit competition, to reduce the exposure to capital ￿ ight, and to reduce the exchange-rate
risk. This type of regulation can a⁄ect the banking sector stability mainly through its
e⁄ect on competition in the banking industry. Unfortunately, the theoretical literature so
far does not agree on the link between competition and stability. One view is that when
banks can earn monopoly rents, they become relatively conservative. Their banking charter
is valuable and, thus, they shun the risk of bankruptcy, because bankruptcy would cause
the loss of a valuable charter. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) provide a di⁄erent view. They
argue that the previous view holds only when one focus only on deposit market competition.
But if one takes into account the competition on the asset side, the implication is di⁄erent.
They show that there is a risk-incentive mechanism that operates in exactly the opposite
direction, causing banks to become more risky as their markets become more concentrated.
From Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) almost every country has set a minimum amount
of capital that is needed in order to obtain a licence (or a charter for banking activities).
Although the entry of foreign funds was prohibited for acquisition, subsidiary, and creation
of a branch during the 1980s, according to Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) almost no
banking system is now restricting foreign funds to invest in banking. Meanwhile, they
found that the percentage of entry applications denied is greater for low-income countries
than for high-income countries; and that developing countries place more limitations on
foreign bank ownership of domestic banks and foreign bank entry through branching than
developed countries.
3.3 Regulations A⁄ecting the Managers￿and/or Owners￿Behavior
Since the theoretical literature has pointed out many market failures which can lead man-
agers to take too much risk or to take improper actions without being disciplined by a free
well-functioning ￿nancial market, many regulations have been designed to deal with this
issue: the risk-based deposit insurance, disclosure requirements, bank chartering, and bank
examination.
a) Deposit insurance was ￿rst introduced in the US after the Great Depression and
has since been adopted by many countries. In their survey of 2001 Barth, Caprio, and
Levine observed that at least 77 countries were applying it; while Demirg￿￿-Kunt, Kane,
16and Laeven (2006) found that 87 countries were applying it by the end of 2003. It aims at
reducing the likelihood of bank runs and panics in the banking system. Theoretical models
(e.g., Diamond and Dybvig (1983)) show that complete deposit insurance will successfully
prevent and stop the possibility of bank runs and panics. However, complete insurance is
likely to introduce moral hazard into the banking system and therefore increase its fragility.
In fact, complete insurance removed any incentive for depositors to worried about the risk
taken by banks; as a result they focus only on the deposit interest rate. In case of compe-
tition, banks will increase their deposit rate in order to attract more depositors. In order
to keep their pro￿t, they will increase the lending rate which will increase ceteris-paribus
their proportion of non-performing loans and therefore the risk of insolvency. That is why a
new type of deposit insurance has emerged, namely risk-based deposit insurance premiums.
If the deposit insurance premium, provided by the government, is priced appropriately to
re￿ ect the amount of risk taken by a bank, it will solve the moral hazard issue.12
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) found that developing countries are almost three times
as likely as developed countries not to have an explicit deposit insurance scheme.
b) Disclosure requirements aim at mitigating the asymmetry of information available in
the banking industry. Generally, regulators require that banks adhere to certain standard
accounting principles and disclose a wide range of information that helps the market to
assess the quality of a bank￿ s portfolio and the degree of the bank￿ s exposure to risk. This
type of regulation is widely used by high-income countries and less by developing countries.
For example, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) point out that the percentage of banks rated
by international credit rating agencies is seven times greater for high-income countries as
compared to low-income countries.
c) Bank chartering aims at preventing dishonest people and overly ambitious entrepre-
neurs from engaging in highly speculative activities. In fact, chartering proposal for new
banks are screened to prevent dishonest and speculative people from controlling banks.
Almost every country has this type of regulation.
d) Bank examination, or supervision, or monitoring helps to limit moral hazard incen-
tives for excessive risk taking. Since it is not enough to have regulations which encourage
less risk taking, banks must be monitored to see if they are complying with these regula-
tions. This type of regulation improves the quality of the ￿nancial information given to the
public by bank owners and managers and can also serve to enforce the existing regulations.
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) found that the degree of private monitoring increases
12Risk-based deposit insurance premiums are theoretically appealing but in practice they have not worked
very well mainly because it is hard to accurately determine the amount of risk a bank is actually taking.
17as one compares lower-income countries to higher-income countries and that the tenure of
supervisors is less in developing countries than in developed countries.
4 Review of Empirical Methodologies
The empirical analysis of the link between regulation and stability of the banking system
had so far taken two main directions. The ￿rst direction is to compute, using a measure
of risk assessment, the risk taken by banks during a period under which a given type of
regulation was under implementation and to see if the dynamic of the risk is associated with
the given regulation. We will refer to this method as the implicit-fragility method. This
method is generally applied on bank-level data in a given economy or on bank-level data
of a group of economies. The second direction is to talk about banking fragility in a given
economy. The fragility measure here takes the form of a dummy variable which takes the
value 1 if a banking system is assumed to be in a systemic banking crisis situation during
a given year, and 0 if not. Under this method cross-country data and discrete regression
model are widely employed.
Of course this is not the only dimension in which one can classify these studies; but
this classi￿catiion is appealing because it allows a dichotomic analysis of empirical studies
based on the empirical methodology.
4.1 Implicit-Fragility Method
There is at least three classes of econometric models which use the implicit measure of
fragilty to assess the impact of regulation on banking stability. These classes are: the si-
multaneous equation model, which is generally used to study the impact of capital adequacy
requirement on bank￿ s risk, the discrete regression model which is mainly used in studies
using the rate recorded by credit rating agencies, and the survival and hazard models used
to model the probability of a bank￿ s failure.
4.1.1 Simultaneous Equation Model
The simultaneous equation model was ￿rst used by Shrieves and Dahl (1992) to analyze ad-
justments in capital ratio and risk following the imposition of capital adequacy requirement
in the US banking system.13 The key ingredient of this model is that observed changes
in bank capital ratios and portfolio risk levels can be decomposed into two components,
13It has since then been used by a great number of authors e.g., Jacques and Nigro (1997), Rime (2001),
and Nachane et al. (2000).
18a discretionary adjustment, and a change caused by an exogenously determined random
shock, such that ￿
￿CAPjt = ￿dCAPjt + Ejt
￿RISKjt = ￿dRISKjt + Ujt
where ￿CAPjt and ￿RISKjt are observed changes in capital ratios and risk levels for bank
j in period t, ￿dCAP and ￿dRISK represent discretionary adjustments in capital ratios
and risk levels, and E and U are exogenous shocks. Recognizing that banks may not be
able to adjust their desired capital ratios and risk levels instantaneously, the discretionary
changes in capital and risk are modeled using a partial adjustment framework.
￿
￿CAPjt = ￿(CAP￿
jt ￿ CAPj;t￿1) + Ejt
￿RISKjt = ￿(RISK￿
jt ￿ RISKj;t￿1) + Ujt
Thus, observed changes in bank capital ratios and portfolio risk in period t are functions
of the target capital ratio CAP￿
jt and target risk level RISK￿
jt, the lagged capital ratio
CAPt￿1 and risk levels RISKt￿1 and any random shocks.
The target capital ratio level is not observable, but is assumed to depend upon some
set of observable variables, including the changes in portfolio risk (￿RISKjt), while the
exogenous shock that could a⁄ect bank capital ratios is the regulatory pressure. Also, the
target risk level is not observable, but is assumed to depend on a set of observable variables
including the changes in portfolio risk (￿CAPjt), while the exogenous shock that could
a⁄ect bank capital ratios is the regulatory pressure. This assumption helps to recognize the
possible simultaneous relationship between capital and risk.14
To complete the empirical estimation of the simultaneous equation system one must
provide a measure of the bank capital and a measure of the portfolio risk of banks. In
the literature, portfolio risk is measured in two ways: using the ratio of total risk weighted
assets to total assets, and using the gross non-performing loans as percentage of total assets
(see, e.g., Avery and Berger (1991), Berger, Herring, and Szego (1995), and Shrieves and
Dahl (1992)). The literature also uses two de￿nitions of a bank￿ s capital ratio: the ratio
of capital to total assets (see, e.g., Shrieves and Dahl (1992), and the ratio of capital to
risk-weighted assets (see, e.g., Jacques and Nigro (1997), Aggarwal and Jacques (1998) and
Ediz, Michael and Perraudin (1998)).
In this literature also, the regulatory pressure is a cornerstone of the hypotheses involving
minimum capital standards; hence, it should be captured. Generally, the regulation pressure
(REG) is a binary variable.
14Shrieves and Dahl (1992) argued that a positive relationship between changes in capital and risk may
signify, among other possibilities, the unintended impact of minimum regulatory capital requirements or
even managerial risk aversion. Jacques and Nigro (1997) argued that a negative relationship may result
because of methodological ￿ aws in the capital standards.
19Let us denote by OTHERS the other variables a⁄ecting the banking capital and the
bank￿ s risk. The model can be broadly set as
￿
￿CAPjt = ￿0 + ￿1REGjt + ￿2OTHERSjt + ￿3￿RISKjt + ￿4CAPjt￿1 + ujt
￿RISKjt = ￿0 + ￿1REGjt + ￿2OTHERSjt + ￿3￿CAPjt + ￿4RISKjt￿1 + vjt
where ujt and vjt are error terms. This model is generally estimated using a two or a three-
stage least-square procedure. Authors using the three-stage method argue that it allows
them to take into account the simultaneity of banks￿adjustments in capital and risk and to
get estimates that are asymptotically more e¢ cient than under the two-stage technique.
4.1.2 Methodology with the Credit Rating
Some authors working on bank level data use the rate of commercial banks provided by
the international rating risk agencies as their measure of risk. Typically these agencies rate
banks￿￿nancial strength on a N￿point scale, ranging from E to A+. Since these rates form
a limited dependent variable, the appropriate econometric model used to assess the impact
of regulation on the banking system stability here is an ordered probit or logit. Speci￿cally,
the regression equation estimated is:
RATij = ￿0 + ￿1REGj + ￿2BKCij + ￿3INSj + ￿4MEVj + uij
where the subscript i denotes the country and the subscript j denotes the bank; with RAT
for rating, REG for regulation, BKC for banking characteristics, INS for institutions,
MEV for macroeconomic variables.15
4.1.3 Survival Model
Some authors use the probability of bank failure as their measure of fragility. They then
study the impact of regulation on this probability of failure. In the literature survival
econometric model of Kaplan-Meier is generally used.16
4.2 Explicit-Fragility Method
So far in the literature, there are two econometric methodologies used to study the link
between banking regulation and banking instability when the dependent variable is the
explicit dummy variable of banking crisis. The most frequent one is the Demirgu￿-Kunt and
Detragiache (1998), hereafter DKD98 method, which consists of using a discrete regression
model in the context of panel data. More precisely, DKD98 built a model similar to this:
15See Demirg￿￿-Kunt, Detragiache, and Tressel (2006) for more details.
16See, e.g., Erlend and Baumann (2006), and Sheldon (2006) for more details
20Let P￿
it denotes an unobservable variable representing the probability that the banking
system of country i su⁄ers a systemic crisis at time t, and Pit - a dummy variable which
takes the value 1 when country i su⁄ers a systemic banking crisis at time t and 0 otherwise.
The probability of a systemic banking crisis is modelled as follows:
￿
Pit = 1 if P￿
it > C




it = ￿0Xit + "it
and where Xit represents the matrix of all exogenous variables; i the country index; t the
time index, and C a threshold value of the banking crisis probability.
The impact of each regulation on the banking system stability can be assessed by aug-
menting the above benchmark model of banking crises with variables capturing some charac-
teristics of the banking regulation. Let us denote by Lit the matrix of variables representing
the regulatory measures in country i at time t. The reduced form equation can be given by
P￿
it = ￿0Xit + ￿0Lit + "it:
If ￿ is signi￿cant and negative, then regulation reduces the probability of the banking system
to be in a systemic crisis.
This model is estimated using the logit regression model in the context of panel data.
The sign of the estimated coe¢ cients for each exogenous variable shows how an increase of
that explanatory variable increases or decreases the probability of a crisis. However, as it is
well known for a binary model, the estimated coe¢ cients cannot represent the magnitude of
the e⁄ect of a marginal change in the exogenous variable on the likelihood of a banking crisis.
Each coe¢ cient instead re￿ ects the e⁄ect of a change in a given explanatory variable on
ln(Pit=(1 ￿ Pit)); so that the magnitude of the e⁄ect on the probability of a crisis depends
on the slope of the cumulative distribution function at ￿0Xit + ￿0Lit: it follows that the
magnitude of the change in the probability of a banking crisis depends on the initial values
of all the exogenous variables and their coe¢ cients. Hence, after the estimation of the
logit model, the following step is to compute the marginal coe¢ cient estimates which are
evaluated at the sample mean. These estimates represent the magnitude of the link between
each exogenous variable and the probability of a systemic banking crisis evaluated at the
sample mean.
The literature tends to use the logit instead of the panel-logit to estimate this model
because the former is always convergent and the latter may not be.
21The second method consists of using the discrete regression model but in the context of
cross-section data. More precisely, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) use the cross-section
data over a ￿ve-year period time. Their dependent variable, which is the dummy variable
for a crisis, is de￿ned as follows: if a country has su⁄ered a systemic banking crisis during
the ￿ve-year period, the dummy variable takes on the value 1; if not it is 0. The regulatory
variables are taken from a survey, and the macroeconomic control variables are the average
of this variable over the ￿ve-year period. They then use a simple logit model to assess the
impact of each regulatory measure on the banking instability.
5 Review of Empirical Studies
We will carry out our empirical review with respect to the above classi￿cation. Let us ￿rst
start with the implicit-fragility method.
5.1 Empirical Studies Using the Implicit-Risk Method
A great number of theoretical as well as empirical studies have been carried out on the
impact of the capital adequacy requirement on the banking stability or the risk-taking
behavior of bank managers in developed economies over the last decade. A lot of research
has been done on the US banking system. Generally, these works use individual bank-level
data and compute a measure of risk taken by each bank. Let us ￿rst present the work
already done for the US banking system before presenting the work for other economies.
5.1.1 Capital Standard and Stability
In the US Banking System. The capital standard was ￿rst introduced in the US
banking system in 1981.17 Even before the introduction of the Basel I Accord on capital
requirement, many theoretical studies have been carried out on this regulation regarding the
risk-taking behavior of bank owners and managers. The most important studies were Koehn
and Santomero (1980), and Kim and Santomero (1988). The message of this theoretical
work was that capital standard may not be e⁄ective if not risk-related. Since then a lot
of economists have carried out empirical studies on the US banking system to test this
theoretical conclusion.
The ￿rst empirical work for the US banking system is the paper of Furlong (1988).
He used the data of 98 large US bank holding companies from 1975 to 1986. He de￿ned
the risk taken by banks as the volatility of underlying asset values. He computed this by
17This was even before the introduction of the Basel I accord which was adopted by the G10 countries in
1988.
22inverting the call option pricing formula, and found that asset risk measured in this way
doubled during the period 1981-86 in the part of his sample in which banks were under
capital requirements, compared with the earlier period. However, banks which were well-
capitalized in 1981 before the introduction of capital requirement experienced the same rise
in volatility as those which were not. He then argued that these ￿ndings do not support
the view that an increase in capital adequacy requirement leads banks to increase their
risky-assets.
As noted by Jackson et al. (1999), his interpretation is true only if one assumes that the
level of bank capital in 1981 was representing the desired or the equilibrium capital level. In
this case Furlong￿ s ￿ndings would be inconsistent with the Kim and Santomero￿ s theoret-
ical ￿ndings since well-capitalised banks would not have been subjected to any additional
constraint. But, it is possible that, through the e⁄ects of capital requirements on market
discipline, the introduction of ￿xed capital standards led to an increase in target capital
rates for both highly capitalised and weakly capitalised banks. In this event, Furlong￿ s
￿ndings might be seen as consistent with Kim and Santomero￿ s ￿ndings.
This work has been criticized for not controlling for many variables which could have
a⁄ected risk-taking behavior during that sample period. Also, it hasn￿ t taken into account
the endogeneity of capital ratio and risk. This has motivated the emergence of a new
set of studies. Shrieves and Dahl (1992) built a simultaneous equation model to take into
account the fact that changes in both capital and risk have endogenous as well as exogenous
components, and to focus on the determination of discretionary changes in risk which are
induced by either endogenous or exogenous changes in capital. They then investigated
the relationship between changes in risk and capital in a large sample of US banks over the
period 1983-1987, and found a positive association between changes in risk and capital.18 In
fact, their results established that risk exposure and capital levels are simultaneously related,
and that the majority of banks mitigate the e⁄ects of increases in capital levels by increasing
asset risk posture, and vice versa. They argued that the fact that these relationships
were present even in banks which were in excess of the minimum regulatory requirements
for capital adequacy, supports the conclusion that a positive association between risk and
capital in such banks is not strictly the result of regulatory in￿ uence, but rather re￿ ects the
view that risk-taking behavior tends to be constrained by bank owners￿and/or managers￿
private incentives. Their ￿ndings suggest then that capital standard tends to increase the
risk in the US banking system.
18Where risk is measured using the gross non-performing loans as percentage of total assets, and bank￿ s
capital ratio is the ratio of capital to total assets.
23We can then conclude that taking into account the endogenous part of an increase in
capital and risk can make a huge di⁄erence to the results and that the ￿rst capital regulation
applied on US bank over the period 1980-1988 end up increasing the risk taken behavior in
the banking industry.
Jacques and Nigro used the same empirical methodology to test the e⁄ectivity of capital
regulation as implementing under Basel I. They obtained a di⁄erent result. In fact, Jacques
and Nigro (1997) studied the impact of risk-based capital standards on capital ratio and
risk in the US banks under the period 1990-91 and found that changes in the capital
ratio and risk are negatively related, i.e., an increase in the level of capital reduces the
risk taken by US banks. This result is con￿rmed by Haubrich and Watchel (1993) who
argued that the implementation of the Basel I risk standards caused poorly-capitalised
banks to recon￿gure their portfolios away from high-risk and towards low-risk assets, but
it runs contrary to Hancock and Wilcox (1992) who found out that, banks that had less
capital than required by the risk-based standards, shifted their portfolios towards high-risk
assets. The implicit-fragility method failed then to close the debate about the e⁄ectivity
of capital standard as applied under the Basel I Accord for banking stability in the US
banking system. To end this subsection, let us review the Dahl and Spivey (1995) paper
which provides an indirect way of assessing the importance of capital standard on banking
stability. They used US bank data over the period 1980-88 to assess the likelihood and
timing of bank recovery from undercapitalization. They noted that there appears to be only
a limited capacity for banks to change positions of undercapitalization by growth limitations
or dividend restrictions, and that the impact of pro￿tability on recovery is greater the longer
a bank remains undercapitalized. Hence, the design of the capital requirement has important
implications not only for optimal capital levels, but also for the level of risk and the safety
and soundness of the banking system as a whole.
In Other Countries￿Banking Systems Outside of the US, studies on the impact of
capital adequacy requirement on banking stability using the implicit-risk method are scarce.
So far, we have found two studies on the Switzerland banking system (Rime (2001), and
Sheldon (2001)), a study on the group of ten member countries of the Basel committee
(Sheldon (1996)) and a study on the Indian banking system (Nachane et al. (2000)).
Using a modi￿ed version of the Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Rime (2001) built a simulta-
neous equations model to analyze adjustments in capital and risk in Swiss banks and found
that regulatory pressure to implement capital adequacy requirement induced banks to in-
crease their capital ratio but did not a⁄ect the level of risk. In his study, risk is measured by
24the ratio of risk-weighted earnings to total assets. He argued that his ￿ndings indicate that
for Swiss banks, an increase in available capital through retained earnings or equity issues
is less costly than a downward adjustment in the risk of the portfolio, and that a rationale
for this can be the absence of a developed market for asset-backed securities in Switzerland.
However, this runs contrary to the result found by Sheldon (2001) on banks that operated
in Switzerland during the period 1987-99. He estimated the impact of the capital standard
on the probability of banks￿failure and found that over this period the capital adequacy
requirement succeeded in increasing the banks￿safety, although it decreased the pro￿tabil-
ity of banks, and ￿nally that the level of adequacy requirement was too high from a welfare
point of view. The di⁄erence in results can be due to sample periods and the methodology
used.
Nachane et al. (2000) provided an empirical assessment of the impact of capital adequacy
requirement on the risk-taking behavior of India￿ s commercial banks. Their study examined
27 Indian public sector banks using year-end data for 1998. Their measures of risk were:
the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets and the ratio of gross non-performing loans
to total assets. They found that banks adjusted their capital ratios signi￿cantly, but their
risk positions adjusted relatively slowly to the respective target levels. They argued that
this suggests that changes in capital and risk are negatively related.
Sheldon (1996) performed an analysis of the equity and asset volatilities of 219 banks
from the group of ten member countries of the Basel committee over the period 1987 to
1994. He found that bank asset volatility in the US banks rose and that this was the case
both for banks which increased their capital ratios and for those which did not. In Japan,
asset volatility fell, although most banks raised their capital ratios. He concluded that he
found little evidence that the implementation of the Basel guidelines had a risk-increasing
impact on bank portfolios.
5.1.2 Other Regulations and Banking Stability
In the literature of implicit-fragility some studies have been done on deposit insurance,
entry restriction, and a broad notion of regulation.
Deposit Insurance We have found one study on the Japanese government safety-net and
its links with stability. It is the paper of Horiuchi (1999) which examines how the Japanese
government safety-net mechanism generated fragility in the banking system during the
1990s. He found that even though the Japanese safety net protected depositors from losses
associated with bank failures, it did not implement prudential regulations to prevent moral
25hazard associated with it. The later translated into the systemic banking crisis that Japan
experienced during that period. This study therefore associated deposit insurance with
banking crises in Japan.
Cull, Senbet and Sorge (2005) found a similar result using the volatility of credit to
the private sector as the proxy for risk in a cross-country analysis. More precisely, they
found that the decision to introduce deposit insurance increases the volatility of credit to
the private sector in countries with weak institutions. Demirg￿￿-Kunt and Huizinga (2004)
also found a similar result about the association of deposit insurance with banking fragility.
They used bank-level data to study the e⁄ect of deposit insurance on market discipline of
banks. They focused on the disciplinary role of interest rates and deposit growth and found
that market discipline is stronger in countries with better institutions, but that the presence
of generously designed deposit insurance is able to reduce its e⁄ect signi￿cantly, leading to
banking system fragility. Nier and Baumann (2006) found the same result using bank-based
data that ￿government safety nets result in lower capital bu⁄ers and that stronger market
discipline resulting from uninsured liabilities and disclosure results in larger capital bu⁄ers,
all else equal,￿ . In other words, the deposit insurance is less important for banking stability
than market-discipline.19
Entry Restriction Many studies have investigated the link between entry restriction and
an implicit measure of banking fragility using US banking data. Keeley (1990) presented
evidence that the relaxation of state branching restrictions in the 1980s increased competi-
tion and induced large US bank holding companies to increase their risk pro￿les, as proxied
by estimates of market capital-to-asset ratio. But Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) used a
substantially larger sample of US bank and found that deregulation was followed by sharp
reduction in loan losses, contrasting keeley￿ s result. Also Dick (2006) used charged-o⁄losses
and loan loss provisions as implicit measures of fragility and found evidence of a positive
link between the Riegle-Neal branching deregulation in the 1990s and the banking system
fragility.
Also, viewing bank concentration as a symptom of regulatory restriction, Evrensel (2007)
applied non-parametric and parametric methods of survival analysis to study the impact of
bank concentration on banking crises. The empirical results suggest that concentration in
the banking sector increases the survival time. In other words, it reduces the probability
19This result about a positive association of deposit insurance and banking instability was found as a
byproduct of their research on market discipline. Nier and Baumann (2006) found, using a cross-country
panel data set consisting of observations on 729 individual banks from 32 countries over the years 1993 to
2003, that competition leads to greater risk.
26of bank failure. Another result is that the G10 and non ￿ G10 countries constitute two
distinct groups of countries, where the non￿G10 countries have a higher incidence of bank
crises.20 The parametric survival time regressions con￿rmed the possibility that the e⁄ects
of the covariates on bank crises may have di⁄erent dynamics in the G10 and non ￿ G10
countries. The study states that the di⁄erent dynamics associated with banking crises in
developed and developing countries seem to be related to the absence of competitive forces
in the economic and political environment.
In the same order of idea Boyd and Runkle (1993) and De Nicolo (2000) related indica-
tors of bank failure probability to bank size. They argue that the size variable is likely to be
correlated with market power viewed as an implicit measure of entry restriction. Boyd and
Runkle (1993) found no signi￿cant link between bank size and bank failure probabilities.
Meanwhile, De Nicolo (2000) found a positive and signi￿cant relationship between bank
size and failure probabilities for the US, Japan, and many European countries.
We can then conclude as Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) that this empirical literature has
produced mixed ￿ndings.
Broad Notion of Regulation Some studies used a broad notion of regulation. They
de￿ned an index of banking regulation as a weighted average of many types of regulation.
For example, Gonzalez (2005) provide a channel through which banking regulation a⁄ects
banking stability: charter value. The study used a panel database of 251 banks in 36
countries to analyze the impact of bank regulations on bank charter value and risk-taking.
He found, after controlling for the presence of deposit insurance and for the quality of a
country￿ s contracting environment, that regulatory restrictions increase banks￿risk-taking
incentives by reducing their charter value. More precisely, banks in countries with stricter
regulation have a lower charter value, which increases their incentives to follow risky policies.
In other words, there is a negative relationship between regulatory restrictions and the
stability of banking systems. He also found that the deposit insurance can have a positive
e⁄ect on stability if it is exogenous, but if it is endogenous, it is not relevant for stabilization
purposes. Gonzalez used non-performing loans to total loans and bank stock price volatility
as the measure of risk in banks.
Demirg￿￿-Kunt, Detragiache, and Tressel (2006) studied whether compliance with the
Basel Core Principles for e⁄ective banking supervision (BCP) improves bank soundness.
They argued that BCP compliance assessments provide a unique source of information
20The G10 refers to the group of eleven countries member of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
More precisely, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom and the United States.
27about the quality of bank supervision and regulation around the world. They found a
signi￿cant and positive relationship between bank soundness (measured with Moody￿ s ￿-
nancial strength ratings) and compliance with principles related to information provision.
Speci￿cally, they found that countries, which require banks to report their ￿nancial data
regularly and accurately to regulators and market participants, have sounder banks. They
found similar results when the soundness was measured through z ￿ scores yields. They
interpreted their ￿ndings as evidence that transparency makes supervisory processes e⁄ec-
tive, strengthening market discipline, and that it is the most important element of the core
principles.
A bemol for this study is the fact that Moody￿ s ￿nancial strenght ratings like any risk
rating may not be the relevant measure of fragility. This fact has been bring in light by the
ongoing subprime crisis.
5.1.3 Remarks on the Implicit-Fragility Literature
The general result found in the implicit-fragility literature about the relationship between
capital standard and stability is that: (i) bank capital regulation as implemented before the
Basel I Accord was inappropriate for stbilization purposes because it was not risk-related;
(ii) bank capital regulation as implemented during Basel I Accord has not shown convinc-
ingly that it has any e⁄ect in ￿ghting risk-taking in the banking sector. This has motivated
regulators to introduce the Basel II capital standard. So far no empirical assessment of the
impact of the Basel II Accord on risk-taking in banking have been found in the literature. It
will take some time to be able to carry out a good study on this new accord. This time may
even be longer than usual, since the introduction of Basel II in the US has been coupled
with a banking crisis.21 A key issue one should take into account should be the endogenous
part of the level of the capital ratio.
Apart from the capital standard, other types of regulation have not been scrutinized
by many authors. Their ￿ndings however show that regulation directly a⁄ecting the bank
manager￿ s and/or owner￿ s behavior (excluding full deposit insurance) seems e⁄ective for
stabilization purpose. However, one cannot conclude strongly whether the empirical ￿ndings
presented in this section are robust, since we have only a few studies. Therefore, these
regulations need additional empirical scrutiny.
However, the implicit-fragility method will always bring controversy as some would argue
that the measure of the risk which is taken into account may not be the one which matters
21This crisis caused by the subprime loans for housing cannot be accounted for as a consequence of Basel II;
more reasonably, it can be viewed as an evidence of the weakness of the Basel I Accord on capital standard.
28for stability.
5.2 Explicit-Fragility Method
A recent and growing literature of the empirical studies on banking regulation and stability
using an explicit measure of banking instability departs from the work of DKD98. These
studies use cross-country data on banking regulation and banking crises to assess, using a
discrete variable regression model such as the logit or the probit model, if a given regulatory
measure has successfully contained or reduced the probability of the occurrence of a banking
crisis in a given set of economies. Some studies use all countries with available data, while
others focus on a group of countries such as developing countries, developed countries, etc.
Generally, these studies are motivated by the con￿ icting theoretical results of the e⁄ect
of regulation on the banking system stability. However, the most important reason for the
increase in empirical research on regulation and stability seems to be the availability of
data. Since 1998, a group of researchers at the World Bank : Barth, Caprio, Levine, and
others have developed a comprehensive survey of the banking regulation practices around
the world. From the ￿rst survey in 1998 ￿ 1999 to the third survey in 2007, the number of
countries covered has increased signi￿cantly from 100 to almost every country in the world.
The number of questions and types of regulation practices covered by these surveys have
also increased over this period. They have also assembled a database on banking crises
episodes.
Many studies have used these datasets to answer di⁄erent types of questions, ranging
from the e⁄ect of entry restriction on banking stability, to the e⁄ect of deposit insurance,
capital adequacy requirement, and a broad range of criteria in banking regulation.
5.2.1 Banking Liberalization
A key question which has earned empirical scrutiny is whether banking liberalization is
likely to increase the banking system fragility. Many proxies of banking liberalization are
used in this literature. The most common are the removal of entry restriction, and the
removal of interest rate ceiling.
Using the removal of entry restriction as the proxy of banking liberalization, Beck,
Demirg￿￿-Kunt, and Levine (2006a) used data from 69 countries over the period 1980 ￿
1997. They applied the DKD98 discrete regression model, they controlled for banking
concentration, and they found that tighter entry restrictions and more severe regulatory
restrictions on bank activities increase bank fragility. A higher fraction of entry applications
denied which is their proxy for tighter entry regulations, leads to higher levels of fragility
29in the banking system. They argue that their result is consistent with the argument that
restricted entry reduces the e¢ ciency of the banking system, also making it more vulnerable
to external shocks. Besides, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) found that the likelihood
of systemic banking crisis is positively associated with greater limitations on foreign bank
entry; and they found no evidence of positive association between domestic entry restrictions
and banking stability. Their methodologies are quiet di⁄erent in the sense that they ￿rst
use panel data and control for concentration, the second one use only cross-country average
data. The di⁄erence in the results may also be due to the fact that in the ￿rst study, it is
the fraction of banks being refused the entry instead of a dummy variable taken the value 1
if there is a legislation allowing free entry and 0 if not. Both studies are relevant, the ￿rst is
more compelling since it uses panel data which allow for more dynamic but it falls short on
making a distinction between domestic entry restriction and foreign bank entry restriction
which is certainly important.
But before all theses studies, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) used removal of
interest rate ceiling as the proxy of banking liberalization and provided the ￿rst empirical
assessment of the link between banking liberalization and ￿nancial fragility using a dummy
variable of banking crises. Their study used a panel data of 53 countries over the period
1980￿1995. They found that banking crises were more likely to occur in countries with more
liberalized ￿nancial systems. They pointed out that the ￿nancial liberalization￿ s impact on
a fragile banking sector is weaker in countries with strong institutions￿ especially where there
is respect for the rule of law, a low level of corruption, and good contract enforcement. They
also found that even in the presence of macroeconomic stabilization, less entry restriction
is likely to be linked with the occurrence of banking crises in countries where institutions
to ensure legal behaviour, contract enforcement, and e⁄ective prudential regulation and
supervision are not fully developed.
Noy (2004) found almost the same result when studying the e⁄ect of liberalization on
banking stability using data from non-OECD countries. He examined the hypothesis that
insu¢ cient prudential supervision of the banking sector after the removal of interest rate
ceiling results in excessive risk-taking by ￿nancial intermediaries and a subsequent crisis.
The paper used a panel-probit model of the occurrence of banking crises controlling for
macro-economic, institutional and political variables to test this hypothesis. It found that
banking liberalization is positively link to the occurrence of banking crisis. The result is
less robust when he controlles for corruption and also when he restricts his analysis only on
emergent market economies.
Therefore, depending on the proxy of banking liberalization variable, liberalization can
30increase fragility or can improve the stability. More precisely, empirical studies link entry
restrictions to fragility and interest rate ceiling to stability.
5.2.2 Capital Standard
So far we have found in the literature only one study on the impact of capital standard
on banking stability using the explicit-fragility method. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004)
found a signi￿cant negative relationship between higher ratio of capital requirement and
non-performing loans. However, when they used the explicit dummy variable for banking
crises, they found some speci￿cations in which capital requirement entered with a negative
and signi￿cant coe¢ cient. They interpreted this result as evidence that the relationship
between capital adequacy requirement and banking stability is not very robust.
5.2.3 Deposit Insurance
Before the important empirical research of Demirg￿￿-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), here-
after DKD02, there was a large body of theoretical literature on deposit insurance and its
association to fragility. However, there was a large divergence in the results of these stud-
ies too. DKD02 used cross-country panel data on 61 countries over the period 1980-1997
and found that explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the likelihood of banking crises,
the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment
is weak. They also found that the negative e⁄ect of deposit insurance on banks￿stability
is stronger the more extensive is the coverage o⁄ered to depositors, where the scheme is
funded, and where it is run by the government. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) found a
positive association between the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme and the bank
fragility. Their relationship was robust to alterations in the control variables. This was
consistent with the view that deposit insurance not only substantially aggravates moral
hazard but also produces deleterious e⁄ects on banking stability.
However this result has not been found to be robust by Arteta and Eichengreen (2006).
In fact, they assessed the link between banking fragility and deposit insurance using a sample
of 75 emerging market economies over the period 1975￿1997 and found no signi￿cant e⁄ect
of deposit insurance on the probability of the banking system to be in a systemic crisis
episode. They argued that what led to this di⁄erence was that they had more data on
deposit insurance on emerging market than DKD02. However, there are two main reasons
for this di⁄erence: (i) Arteta and Eichengreen do not consider the design of the deposit
insurance, which was proved by DKD02 to be relevant; (ii) they also do not take into
account the endogeneity problem between the likelihood of banking crisis and the adoption
31of deposit insurance. Therefore, the DKD02 is more compelling.
In our view there are still room for improvement in this literature. It is argued that
deposit insurance increases banks fragility through its e⁄ect on moral hazard. On way of
testing this is to see if the adoption of deposit insurance increases the likelihood of insolvency
problem in the banking industry. This idea is close to the one developed by Cull, Senbet
and Sorge (2005).
5.2.4 Overall Banking Regulation
Using the above databases some studies such as: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2000, 2004,
2006), and Barth, Gan, and Nolle (2004) have assessed the stabilization e⁄ect of existing
banking regulations.
In a book entitled "Rethinking Banking Regulation: Till Angels Govern￿based on the
World Bank survey, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006) assessed the importance of each type
of regulatory policy on the stabilization of the banking system. They provided empirical
results for a range of regulations. They found that regulation is not e⁄ective for stability,
and for a long range of criteria. They argued for paying closer attention to the foundations
of the ￿nancial sector, and that without good information and adequate incentives, market
participants will not be able to e⁄ectively monitor banks. These ￿ndings are the summary of
￿ndings already done in one of their previous works: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004). In
this work they used their database on bank regulation and supervision covering 107 countries
to assess the relationship between speci￿c regulatory and supervisory practices and banking-
sector development, e¢ ciency, and fragility. More precisely, they examined the e⁄ect on
banking stability of regulations such as: restrictions on bank activities; entry restriction;
capital adequacy requirement; deposit insurance system design features; supervisory power,
independence, and resources; loan classi￿cation stringency, provisioning standards, and
diversi￿cation guidelines; regulations fostering information disclosure and private-sector
monitoring of banks; and government ownership. They found that regulatory measures
that rely excessively on direct government restriction on bank activities is not good for
stability and can even create fragility. More precisely, they found that the relationship
between capital adequacy requirement and banking stability is not robust. They also found
that regulatory policies that rely on guidelines that force accurate information disclosure,
empower private-sector corporate control of banks, and foster incentives for private agents
to exert corporate control, worked best to promote stability.
They argued that their ￿ndings do not mean that regulations which have not been proven
e⁄ective have no role in strengthening the banking sector. Rather, their interpretation is
32that it suggested a supporting role for regulation, one in which the regulators￿job is to
verify that the information being disclosed by banks is accurate, and to penalize banks that
disclose false, misleading or inadequate information.
Furthermore, Shimpalee and Breuer (2006) found, using cross-section data on twin bank-
ing crises and controlling for institutional factors, mixed evidence that deposit insurance,
the removal of capital controls, a lack of central bank independence, and ￿nancial liberaliza-
tion increase the chance of banking crises.22 Using cross-country data on bank ownership,
regulation and supervision, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2000) investigated the link between
bank ownership and regulation on banking fragility. They found that the tighter the restric-
tions placed on this activity (a bank is not permitted to do securities, insurance and real
estate activities), the greater the likelihood of a banking crisis. The likelihood of a banking
crisis is also greater, on average, the tighter the restrictions placed on bank ownership of
non-￿nancial ￿rms. They also found that restricting the mixing of banking and commerce
is associated with greater ￿nancial fragility. Whereas restricting non-￿nancial ￿rms from
owning commercial banks is not associated with ￿nancial fragility, restricting banks from
owning non-￿nancial ￿rms is positively associated with bank instability. Finally, countries
that restrict banks from owning non-￿nancial ￿rms have a robustly higher probability of
su⁄ering a major banking crisis.
It follows from the empirical studies, using explicit measures of banking crises, that
regulations a⁄ecting the bank￿ s balance sheet or the banking sector structure are generally
at least not e⁄ective for stabilization purposes, and can even increase the fragility of the
banking system. Conversely, regulations a⁄ecting the bank managers￿and/or owners￿be-
havior are e⁄ective. The importance of taking the institutional factors into account has
emerged as these factors are often linked with instability.
6 Summary and New Directions for Research
The empirical literature on banking regulation has so far tried to solve the theoretically
con￿ icting results on banking regulations and banking stability. It has taken two main
directions in respect of the stability measure which is used in the study. The so called
implicit-fragility method uses an implicit measure of fragility such as: the ratio of non-
performing loan on the total asset, bank stock price volatility, and the ratio of risk-weighted
assets to total assets; while the explicit-fragility method uses the occurrence of a systemic
banking crisis in a given economy as the measure of instability.
22Their dataset consists of over 30 countries covering 13 institutional factors for the period 1984-2002.
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estimations. The implicit-fragility method relies mainly on simultaneous equation models,
and on the survival and/or hazard models; while the explicit-fragility method relies on the
discrete regression model such as logit or probit in the context of panel data.
So far, many studies have been done on the US banking system but only few on other
banking systems. Most importantly, many works focus on a given type of regulation, gen-
erally on the capital adequacy requirement, deposit insurance, entry restriction, and super-
vision practices in the banking sector.
Although theses empirical studies have succeeded to provide clear answer to some type of
regulation such as the non risk-related capital regulation and removal of interest rate ceiling,
they have failed to provide a convincing result about the impact of many types of regulation
on banking stability. These con￿ icting results are mostly due to the methodologies used. In
fact, even for studies using the implicit-fragility technique, the results on banking regulation
and instability vary from studies using simultaneous equation models to those using hazard
or survival models. They vary also in the function of the control variables used to account
for the characteristics of the banking system, and ￿nally on the sample periods or sample
countries. The di⁄erence between the simultaneous equations model and the others is that
the former takes into account the endogeneity e⁄ect of some type of regulations.
More precisely, for capital regulation, the theoretical literature on these regulations
provides con￿ iction prediction. It was proven by Koehn and Santomero (1980) and after
by Kim and Santomero (1988) that non-risk￿ related capital adequacy requirement was not
e⁄ective in reducing risk in the banking industry. Empirical studies using data from US
banking industry have proven this. It has then driven practitioners to introduce a risk-
related capital adequacy regulation, the so-called Basel I Accord. But capital regulation
under Basel I has also been criticized, e.g., Blum (1999) which shows that banks￿managers
can successfully increase their risk by using the most risky asset in each category. With the
ongoing subprime banking crisis, issues have come up about the e⁄ectiveness of risk rating of
assets by agencies (con￿ ict of interest, inadequate model), making the credit-risk assessment
di¢ cult to believe in. With the best of our knowledge no comprehensive empirical work
has been done on this regulation. To see if banks actually shift their assets in di⁄erent risk
categories toward the most risky asset, a precise study need to be done in this direction,
and since the Basel I Accord is no longer in use a complete comprehensive assessment of
this over the period 1988- 2006 will help to see exactly what went wrong with it.
The Basel II Accord introduced progressively over the period 2005-2007 is still at it
earlier stage, nevertheless it has been criticized by many. In light of the development of the
34ongoing subprime banking crisis, its complexity is said to make it di¢ cult for regulators
to monitor. Some criticize the importance it provides to internal assessment of risk on
the ground that banks￿managers may have incentive to build less accurate risk assessment
models. The fact that rating agencies assessment of assets is very important in this reg-
ulation has also been criticized. But as it stands now, any empirical assessment of Basel
II would be inappropriate, because its introduction coincided with this worldwide ￿nancial
crisis (the subprime banking crisis) and which is most likely to be link to the weakness of
the Basel I Accord.
The new direction for theoretical as well as empirical research for this regulation is to
reassess the importance of the market risk component of the Basel II Accord. In fact, market
risk has gained greater importance in the vulnerability of the banking system around the
world. The ongoing subprime crisis has proven: (i) on one hand that market risk can e⁄ect
hedge funds and investment banks in such a way that it can generate a systemic banking
crisis characterized by a credit crunch; thus studies should look how the implementation
of capital regulation on investment banks can yield in term of risk taken behavior in the
investment banks industry and what will that implies for the stability of the commercial
banking industry, (ii) on the other hand it has created a debate about the usefulness of
maintaining the same level of capital requirement once the crisis is already there (see, e.g.,
Tcahana Tchana (2008), and also the relevance of mark-to-market accounting standard for
bank assets during crisis time (see, e.g., Allen and Carletti (2008)).
The link between reserve requirement as well as liquidity requirement on banking sta-
bility has earned few empirical studies recently. The main reason is that it is no longer
used for stabilization purposes in developed economy, and in developing countries, reserve
requirement is now replaced by liquidity requirement. There is then a need to assess the
e⁄ect of this liquidity requirement on banking stability in developing countries.
The empirical studies on the link between regulation a⁄ecting the banking sector struc-
ture and stability has fortunately presented less con￿ icting results. Studies using and ex-
plicit measure of fragility show that entry and activities restriction have no positive e⁄ect
on banking stability and that they can actually increase the fragility of the banking system.
But study using implicit measure of fragility present mixed results on US banking system.
This is certainly due to the fact that those studies used di⁄erent type of measure and there-
fore are less comparable. The most convincing implicit measure which is the probability
of failure tends to con￿rm the result obtained with the explicit measure of fragility. Some
studies have found a prominent role for foreign bank restriction on stability. More studies
need to be done in order to see why the impact of foreign banks entry restriction seems
35more important than the one of domestic banks.
For studies on regulation a⁄ecting managers￿and banks owners￿behavior; empirical
studies have focused mainly on deposit insurance. The best studies on the link between
deposit insurance and banking stability agree on the fact that it is source of moral hazard
and that it is a most likely to increase the fragility of the banking system. The new direction
for research will be to test the impact of deposit insurance presence on the solvency crisis
in banking.
With the ongoing debate about the importance of the regulation of manager￿ s compen-
sation structure in the subprime banking crisis, there is a need of an empirical assessment
of the link between management compensation and banking stability.
Overall is it important for practitioners and researchers to come together and de￿ne a
comprehensive measure of fragility in the banking system in light with the ongoing banking
crisis, this will help to improve the vocabulary about banking stability and reduce the
proportion of con￿ icting results found in this empirical literature.
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